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Abstract
RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) is a widely used access control model, which reduces the maintenance cost of classical identity-
based access control. However, despite the benefits of RBAC, there are environments in which RBAC can hardly be applied. We
present FRBAC (Fuzzy Role-Based Access Control), a generalization of RBAC that fits the requirements of environments where
authorization-related information is vague. Moreover, FRBAC deals with environments where the actions that can be executed
over the resources have a fractional meaning, as data lying in databases and QoS-subjected operations. FRBAC generalizes RBAC
through the use of fuzzy relations.
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1. Introduction
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [12, 5, 6] is widely
used in corporate environments with many advantages, but it
presents some problems and impose some constraints in some
concrete environments [13]. We extend the RBAC model to
cope with two types of scenarios (although others could also be
accommodated). The former type covers all scenarios where
the authorization-related information is imprecise. One exam-
ple is the Aware Home project [3] where the level of accuracy
of authenticating sensors is not perfect. Another example can
be the multi-domain environment, where a dynamic trust rela-
tion [2] may exist between the administrative domains and thus
the trust relation affects the way in which the users interact with
the systems. In those scenarios, the imprecision must be prop-
agated through the system to the access decision. The latter
type of scenarios are those where the actions have a fractional
meaning and it makes no sense to permit or not its execution
but to permit the execution to a given degree. For instance, data
lying in databases, where the responses to queries are modified
in order to add a certain percentage of noise [18]. A second
example can be those environments subjected to QoS (Quality
of Service) [11] restrictions.
The aim of this paper is to introduce Fuzzy Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (FRBAC) as a generalization of RBAC. It relies
in the fuzzy user-role and role-permission assignments. These
fuzzy assignments allow to deal in a natural way with impre-
cise information and propagate it through the user-permission
relation to the access decision. The access decision can be for-
mulated with a fractional meaning or it can be defuzzified in
order to deal with permissions that only have a binary sense.
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Fuzzy relations, and fuzzy concepts in general, have been
used to extend RBAC [17, 15, 10], and other access control
models [16, 8, 14]. We provide a novel approach by consider-
ing the fuzziness of the RBAC model itself rather than adding
fuzzy concepts on top of a traditional RBAC model contribut-
ing with a more clear and generic definition. Our work builds
on previous ideas which aim to add a flexibility to traditional ac-
cess control models [7, 9, 1]. We are not aware of any proposal
based on the ideas of RBAC which provides such flexibility in
the user-role and role-permission assignment.
2. FRBAC
We introduce FRBAC departing from the RBAC definition
of the standard in [4], which evolved to [5]. The standard di-
vides the RBAC model into three parts: Core RBAC, which
includes the basic functionality; Hierarchical RBAC, extending
the Core with role hierarchies; and Constrained RBAC, incor-
porating separation of duties constraints. Analogously, we in-
troduce Core FRBAC, Hierarchical FRBAC, and Constrained
FRBAC. We do not consider the notion of sessions included in
the RBAC standard in order to ease the understanding of the
scheme, however it should be easy to export the concept of ses-
sions to FRBAC.
We use the following notation and definitions (as described
in the RBAC definition from [5]).
• US ERS is a set of users.
• ROLES is a set of roles.
• OBS is a set of resources (objects).
• OPS is a set of operations.
• P = 2(OBS×OPS ) is a set of permissions.
Preprint submitted to Information processing letters September 15, 2010
• UA ⊆ US ERS ×ROLES is a set of user-role assignments.
• PA ⊆ PRMS × ROLES is a set of role-permission assign-
ments.
2.1. Core FRBAC
The foundations of FRBAC are the user-role and the role-
permission assignments defined through fuzzy relations of the
form:
• UA : US ERS × ROLES → [0, 1]
• PA : ROLES × PRMS → [0, 1]
That is, there is a mapping relating users with roles and an-
other mapping relating roles with permissions. The user-role
mapping is a set of items of the form ((u, r), µUA(u, r)) where
u ∈ US ERS , r ∈ ROLES , and µUA(u, r) is a function that re-
turns the user-role relation strength. The strength is valued in
the real unit interval [0, 1]. The role-permission relation has an
analogous form.
Given the UA relation, we define the following functions in
order to compute the user-role relation for a given user:
• user roles(u : US ERS ) → Ru, where Ru = {(ri, µRu (ri))},
ri ∈ ROLES and µRu (ri) → [0, 1]. That is, given a user u,
the function user roles(u) returns a fuzzy set containing
the roles (ri) assigned to the user u as well as the strength
of the assignment (µRu (ri)). The function is described as
follows:
user roles(u) = {(ri, µUA(u, ri))|
((u, ri), µUA(u, ri)) ∈ UA}
Given the PA relation, the role-permission function has a
similar form:
• role permissions(r : ROLES ) → Pr, where Pr =
{(pi, µPr (pi))}, pi ∈ PRMS and µPr (pi) → [0, 1]. That
is, given a role r, the function role permissions(r) returns
a fuzzy set containing the permissions assigned to the role
as well as the strength of the assignment. The function is
described as follows:
role permissions(r) = {(pi, µPA(r, pi))|
((r, pi), µPA(r, pi)) ∈ PA}
Once computed, the user-role and role-permission relation,
the user-permission assignment can be derived. The user-
permission relation is defined as the max-min composition of
the UA and the PA relations. We formally define the following
function:
• user permissions(u : US ERS ) → Pu, where Pu =
{(pi, µPu (pi))}, pi ∈ PRMS and µPu (pi) → [0, 1]. That is,
given a user u, the function user permissions(u) returns a
fuzzy set containing the permissions assigned to the user







(pi,min (µPr (pi), µRu (ri))) |
(pi, µPr (pi)) ∈ role permissions(ri)
}
where the union operand ∪ stands for:
(x, µA(x)) ∪ (y, µA(y)) =
=
{(x, µA(x)), (y, µA(y))}, if x , y{(x,max(µA(x), µA(y)))}, if x = y
At access decision time, the response is subjected to find a
user’s privilege which allows the execution of the given action
over the given resource. For those scenarios where the access
has a fractional meaning, we define the following function:
• access : US ERS × OPS × OBS → [0, 1]. That is, given
a user u, an operation op and an object ob j, the access
function returns the access degree that the user u has over
the resource ob j through the operation op. The function is
described as follows:
access(u, op, o)⇒ {µp|(p, µp) ∈ user permissions(u),
(op, o) ∈ p}
The enforcement point must guarantee that the requested ac-
tion is executed (if permitted) under the execution parameters
represented by the access decision strength.
Of course, there are scenarios where the applicability of the
operations over resources is binary: the action is entirely exe-
cuted or it is not. We define a security threshold δ in order to
defuzzificate the access decisions, so a permission is applica-
ble only if the decision strength is equal or greater than δ. This
threshold states the maximum imprecision level that the sys-
tem is willing to tolerate. The given semantics of the security
threshold are imposed by the application itself and the meaning
of the UA and PA relations (see Section 3). The access function
is then redefined as:
• accessδ : US ERS × OPS × OBS → BOOLEAN. That
is, given a user u, an operation op and an object ob j, the
access function returns a boolean values which dictates
whether the user u is allowed to execute the action op over
the resource ob j. The function is described as follows:
accessδ(u, op, o)⇒ access(u, op, o) ≥ δ
2.2. Hierarchical FRBAC
The RBAC standard defines a hierarchical relation between
roles. Given a role r1, the set of users belonging to the role (Ur1 )
and the set of permissions assigned to the role (Pr1 ), a role r2 is
a junior role of r1 if Ur1 ⊆ Ur2 and Pr2 ⊆ Pr1 . That is, the per-
missions of the senior role are inherited from the permissions of
the junior role, and the users of the senior roles also belong to
the users of the junior roles. The inheritance relations between
the roles are specified as a partial order.
2
2.2.1. Crisp inheritance
The RBAC standard describes a partial order RH which de-
fines inheritance relations between the roles:
• RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES
In practice, the roles that a user has are those explicitly as-
signed to the user through the UA assignments and the roles
implicitly assigned to the user through the inheritance relation
RH. We define in the FRBAC model the following inheritance
function over the RH relation:
• inherited(r : ROLES ) → 2ROLES . That is, given a role r,
the function inherited(r) returns the role set containing the
junior roles of r. The function is defined as follows:
inherited(r) = {ri | (r, ri) ∈ RH}
The user-role strength of an inherited role must be subjected
to the user-role strength of its corresponding senior role. Anal-
ogously to Core FRBAC, the user-role and the user-permission
assignment functions under the presence of role inheritance are
defined as:
• user roles↓(u : US ERS )→ Ru:
user roles↓(u) = {(ri ∪ inherited(ri), µUA(u, ri))|
((u, ri), µUA(u, ri)) ∈ UA}






(pi,min (µPr (pi), µRu (ri)))|
(pi, µPr (pi)) ∈ role permissions(ri)
}
2.2.2. Fuzzy inheritance
In FRBAC, the RH relation may be defined as a fuzzy rela-
tion of the form:
• RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES → [0, 1]
In this case, the inheritance function is defined as follows:
• inherited(u : US ERS , r : ROLES ) → Rr, where Rr =
{(ri, µRr (ri))}, ri ∈ PRMS and µRr (ri) → [0, 1]. That is,
given a role r and a user u, the function inherited(u, r) re-
turns a fuzzy set containing the junior roles of r as well as
the inheritance strength, taking into account the strength of
the UA assignment. The function is described as follows:
inherited(u, r) = {(ri,min(µUA(u, r), µRH(r, ri))|
((r, ri), µRH(r, ri)) ∈ RH,
((u, r), µUA(u, r)) ∈ UA}
The inheriting magnitude of every inherited role is com-
puted as the minimum between the inheritance strength
and the user-senior role assignment.
The user-role function is slightly different than under a crisp
inheritance:
• user roles↓(u : US ERS )→ Ru:
user roles↓(u) =
{
(ri, µUA(u, ri)) ∪ inherited(u, ri)|
((u, ri), µUA(u, ri)) ∈ UA}
2.3. Constrained FRBAC
The RBAC standard defines two types of separation of duties:
Static Separation of Duties (SSD) and Dynamic ones (DSD).
DSD are related to the usage of sessions and are out of the scope
of this paper. SSD apply in RBAC in order to prevent users to
be assigned to a role set which allows by itself to misuse the
system. The standard defines the collection SSD as:
• S S D ∈ (2ROLES × N+)
SSD is collection of pairs (rs, n), where each rs is a role set
and n is a natural number greater or equal than 2, with the prop-
erty that no user is assigned to n or more roles from the set rs.
In order to deal with SSD restrictions in FRBAC, we define
the following function:
• role users(r : ROLES )→ 2US ERS . That is, given a role r,
the role users(r) function returns the set of users assigned
to the role r. The function is described as follows:
role users(r) = {ui|((ui, r), µUA(ui, r)) ∈ UA}
SSD restrictions are fulfilled if no user is assigned to mutu-
ally exclusive roles. That is:
∀(rs, n) ∈ S S D,∀s ∈ rs : |s| ≥ n⇒ ∩
s∈rsrole users(s) = ∅
Where the intersection operand ∩ stands for:
(x, µA(x)) ∩ (y, µA(y)) =∅, if x , y{(x,min(µA(x), µA(y)))}, if x = y
Under the presence of roles hierarchies, SSD restrictions
must take into account implicit user-role assignments coming
through role inheritance. Junior roles inherit the member users
from senior roles. We redefine the following function:
• role users↓(r : ROLES )→ 2US ERS :
role users↓(r) = {role users(r) ∪ role users(r′i )|
(r′i , r) ∈ RH}
Then, SSD restrictions are fulfilled if:
∀(rs, n) ∈ S S D,∀s ∈ rs : |s| ≥ n⇒ ∩
s∈rsrole users↓(s) = ∅
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3. Discussion
FRBAC defines a fuzzy (or fractional) vision of the assign-
ments. However, the concrete semantics of the assignments
strongly depend on the application itself. We provide some ex-
amples of its applicability. The reader must note that the mean-
ing of the user-role and role-permissions assignments must be
coherent between them to make it possible their composition.
• Uncertainty: if the fact that a user or a privilege are as-
signed to a given role is based on uncertain information,
the assignment degree can express such uncertainty. In
this case a degree of 1 will express the complete lack of un-
certainty that the user or the privilege belongs to the role,
while a value of 0 will express the complete uncertainty
about the user or the privilege belonging to such role.
• Risk: in some cases the assignment degree can be used
to express the risk associated to the assignment of a given
user or permission to a role. A degree of 1 means that there
is no risk associated to the fact that a user or a privilege
belong to a role, while a degree 0 means full risk.
• Similarity: in some applications, role engineering tech-
niques are used to determine which roles should a user
(or a privilege) be assigned to. Such methods sometimes
rely in how similar are some user attributes compared to
a fix set of attributes associated to each role. It is some-
times difficult to provide a crisp partition of the users into
the roles. So the fuzzy nature of the user-role degree in
FRBAC can more naturally accommodate all cases by ex-
pressing the similarity between the user attributes and the
target attributes of the role.
• Role engineering results and policy exploration: in some
applications, clustering methods can be applied over the
permissions set of the users in order to find access profiles.
In RBAC, access profiles are clearly represented by the
roles. The distance between the kernel of the cluster and
its members can be represented through the magnitude of
the user-role assignment.
• QoS and user profiles: in some environments, restrictions
in the resource allocation must be enforced for every user
in the system. The magnitude of the user-privilege assign-
ment can be used by the resource scheduler in order to
prioritize the resource allocation. The user-attribute mag-
nitude can be understood as a user profiling method.
• Exploration of hierarchies: inheritance relations can be
found out comparing the user’s membership and the per-
missions assigned between different roles. The RBAC
standard defines an inheritance relation between two roles
if all the members of the senior role are a subset of the
members of the junior one and all the privileges of the ju-
nior role also belong to the privileges of the senior one.
However, there are roles that do not completely meet these
conditions but they do it in some extent. Analyzing the
user’s membership and the role-permission assignment,
the inheritance degree of two roles can be computed deter-
mining how close are the roles to meet the two inheritance
conditions.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have described FRBAC, a generalization of
the RBAC based on fuzzy sets. FRBAC defines the user-role,
role-permission and thus the user-permission assignments as
fuzzy relations. It allows to deal with imprecise authorization-
related information and propagate it to the access decision. FR-
BAC allows to formulate fractional access decisions in order
to deal with scenarios where actions have a fractional meaning
such as QoS and data lying in databases. Moreover, in order to
deal with operations that cannot be understood through a frac-
tional view, FRBAC allows to defuzzificate the access decision
making it binary. Although we present FRBAC to deal with
these scenarios, others scenarios could also be accommodated
due to the flexibility of the model.
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